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The 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award has seemingly put an end to the 
deadlock over revenue distribution among the constituents of the federation in Pakistan. This 
paper argues that though the 7th NFC Award’s use of multiple indicator criteria for the 
distribution of resources is a step forward in the right direction, the distribution design still falls 
short on various counts. For example, the weight of 82 percent for the population share is on 
the higher side whereas the demographic structure of the population, an important indicator of 
the expenditure needs, does not figure up in the distribution design. Also, the basis of weights 
assigned to the four elements of the revenue distribution criteria is unknown and no rigorous 
exercise seems to have been undertaken to determine these weights. Similarly, matching 
grants, which are a key element of the distribution design elsewhere, are altogether absent in 
Pakistan. Furthermore, provinces still rely on large transfers from the centre which undermines 
the incentives of the provinces to generate their own revenues. The paper emphasises that there 
is a need to rethink the mechanisms for resource sharing as well as the institutional structure of 
the NFC itself. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is a federal country with two constitutional tiers of the government—the 
federal government and the provincial governments; moreover there are some Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the State of Azad Kashmir. As in many other 
countries, the federal government in Pakistan generates more revenues than its needs. 
Correspondingly, the provinces generate only a small percentage of the revenue required 
to meet their expenditure needs. This calls for transfers from the federal government to 
enable the provinces to carry out their functional responsibilities. The National Finance 
Commission is the institution responsible for devising the revenue sharing arrangement 
between the federal government and the provinces. The Commission recommends the 
sharing of the federal revenue with the four provinces namely Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
1
 The Commission is constituted every five years and has 
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representation (official as well as non-governmental) of all the stakeholders. The 
Commission does not have a permanent existence, however, it is allowed adequate time 
to work on the Award (i.e., announcement of revenue sharing arrangement). The 
provincial ministers of finance and other experts in the areas of finance and fiscal 
management typically man the NFC which is headed by the federal minister for finance. 
The ‘Unanimity rule’—all the provinces and the federal government must agree—is the 
principle that the Commission follows in making its recommendations to the government. 
Several previous Commissions either faced deadlock or were forced to adopt the sharing 
arrangement prevailing at the time due to the failure to develop a consensus on any new 
sharing arrangement. The ‘divisible pool’ i.e., the revenue sources available for sharing is 
specified in the constitution and the President can add revenue sources to the divisible 
pool while notifying the establishment of the Commission. Two kinds of conflicts have 
often marred the proceedings of the Commissions. One, what should be the share of the 
federal government in the divisible pool? Two, what should be the elements of the 
criteria to be used for sharing the divisible pool among the provinces.  
The seventh NFC Award was announced in December 2009 and became effective 
on July 01, 2010. The Award is seen as a landmark in the sense that it broke the deadlock 
that had constrained the National Finance Commissions, constituted in 2001 and 2006, to 
announce the awards. Two major changes contributed to ending the deadlock: reduction 
in the share of the federal government in the divisible pool by 10 percentage points and 
the introduction of a multiple indicator criteria (MIC) for the distribution of the divisible 
pool in place of the earlier criterion that was solely based on population. The distribution 
criteria prescribed by the 7th NFC is given in Table 1. For  comparison, the criterion used 
by the immediately preceding Award has also been included in the table. 
 
Table 1 
Criteria for Distribution of National Revenue 
 Presidential Order 
2006 
7th NFC  
Award 
Provincial Share in Divisible Pool 46.25% 56% increasing to 
57.5% 
Grants and Subventions 3.75% – 
Indicators and Weights   
Population 100% 82.0% 
Poverty  10.3% 
Revenue Generation  5.0% 
Inverse Population Density  2.7% 
Given the Weights indicated above, the provincial share in the Divisible Pool works 
out as follows: 
Punjab 53.01% 51.74% 
Sindh 24.94% 24.55% 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 14.88% 14.62% 
Balochistan 7.17% 9.01% 
Source: Adapted from “Pulling Back from the Abyss: Third Annual Report”, Institute of Public Policy, 
Beaconhouse National University. 
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At present the divisible pool includes the following revenue sources: 
 Personal Income Tax 
 Tax on corporate income 
 Wealth Tax 
 Capital Value Tax 
 Taxes on sales and purchase of goods 
 Custom duties 
 Federal Excise Duty (excluding on Gas)    
The reduction in the share of the federal government in the divisible pool has 
enabled the NFC to recommend transfer of greater funds to all the provinces. Even the 
province of Punjab, which in the past had shown preference for the retention of the 
population share criterion, has not been a loser despite the change in the distribution 
formula. The end of the deadlock coupled with the transfer of more funds to all the 
provinces have earned the award almost universal appreciation. This study aims at a 
critical evaluation of the 7th NFC Award in particular and the distribution design in 
general. The analysis will primarily focus upon the institutional arrangement for the 
distribution of funds and the formula for the distribution of available resources among the 
provinces. 
 
2.  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR  
DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES 
Though the 7th NFC Award has managed to break the deadlock that marred the 
proceedings of the previous two commissions, an important question that arises is: will 
the institutional structure of the NFC prevent deadlocks in the future? To answer this 
question it is important to put in perspective the reasons that led to previous deadlocks 
and the factors that helped to break out of the stalemate. 
 
2.1. The Deadlock 
Historically the divisible pool has been shared among the provinces on per capita 
basis. However since 1996 three out of four provinces have been demanding the inclusion 
of more elements in the distribution criteria. Each province demanded the inclusion of 
such elements that would entitle it to greater transfers from the divisible pool. With 
Karachi being the country’s hub of business activities and the provincial capital, Sindh 
demanded that revenue generation effort be made a part of the distribution criteria. On 
the other hand, Balochistan, the largest province in terms of geographic area, contended 
that its cost of public service delivery was relatively high due to low population density, 
therefore the element of geographic area (reflected in inverse population density) must be 
included in the criteria. Both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan argued that the 
higher poverty levels prevailing in the two provinces required greater transfers to 
alleviate their poverty. Punjab, the largest province in terms of population housed more 
than 60 percent of the country’s population when the deadlock arose in 1996. The 
province stood to gain from the distribution solely on per capita basis and understandably 
argued for the retention of this criterion. With each province insisting on including a 
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different element in the distribution criteria a deadlock in the proceedings of the 
Commissions was imminent especially when the Commissions followed the ‘unanimity 
rule’. 
When the 6th NFC Award was being negotiated in 1996, objections were raised on 
the distribution criteria prevailing then, but these objections were not responded to and 
the Award remained pegged to the old formula. This was mainly due to the fact that the  
political party then in power at the centre drew its strength from the Punjab which was 
adamant on retaining the prevailing formula. The objections that were raised at the time 
of the negotiation of the 6th Award surfaced again with such intensity later on that these 
caused deadlocks over the NFCs of 2001 and 2006. Perhaps even the 6th award reflected 
the strength of the political party in power at the centre and the Punjab over the  
preferences of the other provinces. It is also noteworthy that the four Commissions that 
failed to announce the awards (or adopted the previous awards without any changes) 
were constituted during the military regimes (1979, 1985, 2001 and 2006) which 
demonstrates the capability of democratic regimes which provide a  better environment 
for striking a compromise in situations where interests conflict. 
 
2.1.1.  How the Deadlock Ended? 
Under the 7th NFC Award, each province is to get more transfers from the federal 
government than what it would have received under the previous distribution criteria. 
This was the key to opening the deadlock: with each province getting more funds, all the 
provinces were willing to go along even if some structural issues remained unaddressed. 
Moreover the 7th NFC Award accepted the long standing demand of the three smaller 
provinces for inclusion of their preferred elements in the distribution criteria. The 7th 
NFC Award managed to placate the province of Punjab by introducing a minimal change 
in the weight of the population share—82 percent, down from 100 percent. Moreover, 
this time around, the smaller provinces which had been demanding a change in the 
distribution criteria were a part of the ruling coalition at the centre. Efforts to keep the 
otherwise fragile coalition intact would also have played some role in putting the 
deadlock to an end. Finally, given the previous failures, all the stakeholders were under 
pressure to resolve the conflict. All these factors together helped to resolve the long 
standing conflict over the revenue sharing arrangement. Though the 7th NFC Award has 
ended the stalemate and moved forward, a key structural issue namely the ‘unanimity 
rule’ remains unaddressed making  deadlocks in the future possible.    
 
2.1.2.  The Unanimity Rule 
As mentioned earlier, the National Finance Commissions constituted in 2001 and 
2006 failed to reach a consensus over the distribution formula and, perhaps, over the 
magnitude of the federal share in the divisible pool. The problem apparently lies in ‘the 
unanimity rule’ that the Commission follows in adopting its recommendations.  What is 
the solution? Will the ‘majority rule’ solve the decision making problem. Perhaps not. 
The majority vote can avoid the deadlock in a narrow legal or administrative perspective 
but this may raise problems for the federation. Smaller provinces may complain of being 
the victim of federal hegemony. Alternatively, if the smaller provinces get together as a 
group in the NFC, then the federal government or the larger province (i.e. the Punjab) 
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may feel deprived of their respective share in the resources. Therefore the ‘unanimity 
rule’ under the present institutional arrangement is not a choice but a necessity. The point 
is that notwithstanding the spirit of compromise shown by the federal government and the 
provinces while negotiating the 6th and the 7th NFC awards, the structure of the NFC 
itself has no mechanism to prevent a deadlock. As discussed later in the study, it is 
possible to address this problem by devising an appropriate institutional mechanism.  
 
2.2.  The Need to Rethink the Institutional Arrangement for the  
Distribution of Resources 
The NFCs have a history of failures.  Even though the constitution requires that 
there be an NFC Award every five years, only 8 Awards have been announced since 
independence. The 5th NFC Award, due in 1979 came in 1990—12 years after it should 
have been announced; similarly the 7th Award due in 2001 was delayed by 9 years. The 
Commissions were duly constituted in the intervening periods but these failed to reach a 
consensus over the recommendations. Clearly, something needs to be done to avoid 
possible deadlocks in the future. In this respect, useful insights can be gained from 
research on subjects like assignment of revenue resources to different tiers of the 
government and determination of weights for the different elements of the distribution 
criteria. There is not much evidence to suggest that overtime the NFCs in Pakistan have 
either conducted research on the questions at hand or have made enough use of research 
available on the subject.  
The present institutional set-up of the NFC lacking the mechanism to prevent a 
deadlock situation and the need for research on the issues involved in designing a  
suitable distribution mechanism call for revisiting the institutional structure of the body 
which is responsible for declaring the Award. The next section reviews the institutional 
arrangements used in different countries for making resource transfers to the sub-
nationals with a view to drawing guidelines for devising an appropriate institutional 
arrangement for resource sharing among federal units in Pakistan. 
 
2.3.  Institutional Arrangements Used in Different Countries 
Institutional arrangements used in different countries for devising the distribution 
criteria and making transfers from the federal government to the constituent units can be 
broadly classified into the following three categories: 
(i) Central agency (central government’s ministry), 
(ii) Intergovernmental Forum, 
(iii) Independent Agency. 
 
2.3.1.  Central Agency 
The federal government on its own takes the decision regarding the distribution of 
revenue resources among the constituent units. Typically, the office of the president or 
prime minister or the ministry of home affairs or the ministry of finance assumes the sole 
or partial responsibility for the fiscal transfers to the constituent units. Countries that are 
relying upon a central agency to determine the amount of transfers include Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tanzania, China, Italy, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, 
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Ukraine, Ghana, Zambia and Japan. The rationale for the central agency is that as the 
federal government is responsible for managing the national objectives, therefore the 
transfer decisions should be taken by the federal government. However, this approach 
negates the essence of decentralisation. Shah (2007) suggests that the constitutional 
restrictions on the ability of the federal government to override provincial preferences can 
limit the negative effects of this approach. Shah further suggests that as an alternative to 
the federal government’s direct role in the distribution of federal revenues, a separate 
body could be entrusted the task of designing the fiscal relations among the various tiers 
of the government. The proposed body could either be independent or an 
intergovernmental forum or may be an intergovernmental-cum-civil society forum. 
Pakistan has such a forum. It is appointed by the President every five years.  
 
2.3.2.  Intergovernmental Forums 
The intergovernmental forums are formed to recommend the distribution of the 
federal revenue among the federal government and the constituent units. These forums 
typically enjoy representation from all the stakeholders and provide room for some 
bargaining over the distribution criteria. The limits of the bargaining are defined by the 
constitution e.g., in Pakistan the revenue sources available for distribution are defined by 
the constitution. Shah (2007) prefers a simple distribution criterion which may render 
only approximate justice to each constituent unit over a complex criterion with complete 
justice. The study argues that quite often the constituent units have conflicting interests 
and a forum with conflicting interests cannot handle a complex distribution criterion. 
Countries that rely solely on intergovernmental forums include Germany, Indonesia and 
Nigeria. Pakistan also relies on such a intergovernmental forum with the difference that 
the Commission members also include experts from the civil society of each province. 
Countries like South Africa and India make use of an independent agency in addition to 
the intergovernmental forum.  
 
2.3.3.  Independent Agency 
An independent agency is established by the central government to make 
recommendations to the government or the legislature on resource transfers to the 
constituent units. The members of the agency are experts in fiscal management. Some 
countries, for example India, draw a member from the judiciary as well. Typically, this 
kind of agency has an advisory position. Australia was the first to establish an agency for 
recommending resource transfers in 1933. Since then this institution has become popular 
in a number of countries including India and South Africa. The independent agency was 
established in Australia after some states had expressed dissatisfaction with the process of 
bilateral negotiations with the federal government on requests for special grants. A 
secession threat by Western Australia proved instrumental in the decision to set up an 
independent agency. Thus the origin of the independent agency has lessons for countries 
where one of the constituent units is dissatisfied with the resource distribution. 
The objective of setting up an independent agency is to let the experts recommend 
the distribution criteria based on professional knowledge and rigorous analysis of the 
prevailing economic environment. The rationale for an independent agency is that it can 
disengage the distribution criteria from politics. Shah (2007), however, does not favour 
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the independent agency on the ground that it tends to offer a complex solution to an 
otherwise simple task thus increasing the cost of devising the resource distribution 
criteria. Moreover, given the complexity of the distribution formula it becomes difficult 
for the ordinary citizens to monitor the performance of the agency.  
 
2.4.  Proposed Institutional Arrangement for Distribution of Revenues 
The foregoing suggests that both the intergovernmental forum as well the 
independent agency have their merits and demerits. With the regional representatives on 
board, the intergovernmental forums can protect the regional interests more effectively 
but if these forums follow the unanimity rule then their proceedings are prone to 
deadlock. The independent agencies, comprising experts, can bring the required rigour 
into the revenue sharing exercise but these agencies tend to complicate problems that 
may have a simple solution. A better institutional structure for revenue sharing would be 
one where the two can supplement each other. Therefore we suggest that a two-tier 
institutional structure may be set-up in Pakistan to design revenue sharing among the 
constituents of the federation. The proposed two tiers are: (i) an independent body of 
experts and (ii) an intergovernmental forum.  
An independent body, comprising fiscal experts, practitioners as well as 
academicians, would constitute the first layer of this two-tier structure. Experts will be 
selected without regard to provincial affiliations and they would be full time/part time 
employees of the independent agency. The agency would have the mandate to 
recommend not only the sharing of the divisible pool but also to determine the revenue 
sources that should comprise the divisible pool. The agency would also have the mandate 
to recommend assignment of specific revenue sources to the federal or provincial 
government. The agency would have resources to conduct or commission research on the 
issues under consideration as well as to make use of existing research available on the 
subjects. The agency will commence its task two years before an Award is due and will 
have 16-18 months to conduct research, deliberate upon possible options and then make 
its recommendations. The agency will send its recommendations to the upper tier, the 
intergovernmental forum. The recommendations of the agency would carry detailed 
justification in their support especially if the advice deviates from the established 
formula. The recommendations would also be made public to encourage debate on the 
subject. The independent agency will not insist on arriving at a unanimous set of 
recommendations, a principle which in the past has caused deadlock in NFC proceedings.  
The notes of the dissenting members would form part of the independent agency’s report.  
The upper tier, the intergovernmental forum, will comprise the federal and 
provincial ministers of finance only. The experts need not be on the forum because the 
the expert work has already been done by the independent agency. The forum would 
review the recommendation of the independent agency and may or may not accept all or 
some of these. The forum would pay due regard to the political factors and other 
sensibilities that the independent agency would not have taken into account.  Moreover 
the forum will also take into consideration the public debate on the recommendations of 
the independent agency. If the forum decides not to accept some or all of the 
recommendations of the independent agency, the forum and its individual members 
would have to offer their reasons or justifications for their point of views. The 
52 Khawaja and Din 
intergovernmental forum will then send its recommendation to the government for final 
approval and announcement of the Award.  
This two step approach is likely to put an end to the deadlocks which have beset 
revenue distribution among constituent units in Pakistan. The proposed two-tier 
institutional structure is an improvement over the existing one for the following reasons:  
 The experts drawn from the profession and the academia without regard to 
provincial affiliations and put in the position of a ‘judge’ are less likely to take a 
biased position.  
 The experts being paid employees of the independent agency would do their 
assigned work according to the charter of the body rather than work as a lobby 
for a particular constituent unit.  
 The knowledge that the recommendations of the agency will be debated publicly 
will induce the members to offer sound and practical recommendations. 
 The experts’ reliance on research will: 
 enable the independent agency to offer sound and practical 
recommendations. 
 make it difficult for the agency or the individual members to take unjustified 
positions.  
 It would not be possible for the intergovernamental forum to easily ignore the 
recommendations of the independent body for the following reasons: 
 These would have the backing of eminent experts. 
 The recommendations would have attracted sufficient public debate by the 
time intergovernmental forum takes a decision on these.  
 The forum and its individual members will have to record reasons if they 
decide not to accept the recommendations of the independent agency.  
 
3.  DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE RESOURCES 
The federal revenues available for distribution among provinces have historically 
been distributed on a per capita basis. The 7th NFC Award accepted a long standing 
demand of the three provinces for the introduction of a multiple indicator criteria. The 
rest of this study examines the new distribution design in the light of the revenue 
distribution practices followed in other countries.  
 
3.1.  Resource Distribution Practices Adopted Internationally 
Transfers from federal government to the sub-nationals take several forms. These 
are formula-based as well as discretionary and could be block unconditional, conditional 
or matching. The transfer programmes often aim at fiscal equalisation among the 
constituent units i.e., to enable the constituent units to provide the same kind of service 
with comparable level of taxation.  
In Canada, transfers from the federal to provincial governments are unconditional 
and are given to only those provinces whose revenue raising capacity is below the 
national average. It is noteworthy here that revenue generation is highly decentralised 
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with the share of provincial own-source revenue standing close to 80 percent of the total 
national revenue. It is only under this kind of revenue decentralisation that some 
provinces can manage to function without any equalisation transfers. The Indian system 
essentially involves distribution of funds on the basis of estimated expenditure needs and, 
to an extent, on the potential of the subnationals to generate revenues from their own 
sources. The finance commission of India primarily uses the gap filling approach for 
equalisation of fiscal capacity across states. The states are allocated shares in central 
taxes based on a formula and the difference between a state’s budgetary expenditures and 
its revenues is filled through the grants-in-aid. It is argued that the gap filling 
methodology not only acts as a disincentive for the subnationals to raise own-source 
revenue but is a source of inequity as well. In Australia, the comprehensive nature of 
equalisation allows assessment of all the circumstances that affect the relative cost 
differences a state is faced with in delivering standard services. These include additional 
costs faced by a sub-national government in meeting requirements of large cities as well 
as in providing services in rural areas and remote locations. If a state’s differential per 
capita revenue or expenditures is considered beyond the control of the state, for example, 
due to geography, it is compensated for that.  The Australian approach to equalisation 
requires voluminous data across states at a high level of disaggregation. The Australian 
equalisation programme has been criticised on the grounds of efficiency, complexity and 
reliance on internal standards rather than best practices. It is argued that reliance on 
average internal standards in a sense rewards some states for maintaining lower 
standards. However, by and large, there is a general acceptance of the system. It is 
precisely because of carrying out a very thorough equalisation programme that federal 
government (known as the Commonwealth government) has been able to keep the states 
satisfied despite continuing with the large vertical fiscal imbalance (difference between 
revenue generated by the federal government and states).  
In the United States, unlike other federal countries, there is no general form of 
revenue sharing. However around 600 grant programmes exist for state and local 
governments. The different forms in which grants are provided include project, 
categorical, and block grants. While some grants have matching component, others have 
structured formulas. Barring federal transfers for some specific purposes, the overall 
grant system is small relative to other countries. Though a degree of equalisation is built 
into grant programmes, however, in general, the intergovernmental transfers do not aim 
at equalisation despite wide differences in taxable capacity across states.  
In Germany, the intergovernmental transfer system is highly egalitarian. The 
unique feature of the German system is that richer states transfer money to the poorer 
states. In practice, the states, whose taxable capacity is below the national average, 
receive transfers from the states with taxable capacity above the national average. The 
transfer programme is designed in a manner that fiscal capacity of the below-average 
state is brought to 90 percent of the national average. These interstate transfers are 
unconditional. 
The transfers from the federal governments to the provinces typically attempt to 
equalise fiscal capacity and in some cases fiscal needs as well (United States is an 
exception). The amount of transfers in a number of countries is determined on the basis 
of some formula. Indicators like population share, poverty, demographics, fiscal effort 
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and population density are typically used to determine fiscal needs and capacities. 
‘Population share’ is not considered a good indicator of fiscal needs and is used only in a 
handful of countries. Even the countries that use population share as the criterion for 
revenue distribution typically accord a rather low weight to it in the distribution formula 
e.g., India. Nigeria, with transfers based solely on the basis of population, is an exception. 
Pakistan, with 82 percent weight for population share, stands close to Nigeria. 
Transfers are also used to achieve certain national objectives, for example, 
education and healthcare for all. One of the typical characteristic features of the transfer 
programmes is the use of conditional and matching transfers for the provision of 
healthcare, education and social security. The use of conditional/matching transfers for 
these services reflects the importance attached nationally to the provision of these 
services. The aim is to provide the specified services to all up to a certain minimum level 
defined by the society. Such choices are made through a variety of collective choice 
mechanisms such as voting for electoral promises of the political parties/candidates.  
In Canada, besides the equalisation transfers, the other major forms of transfers are 
the equal per capita transfers which are nominally divided into two components—the 
Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST) which include 
welfare and post secondary education. Only minimal conditions are attached to the 
payments. To be eligible, the provinces cannot impose residency condition on welfare 
payments and health insurance programmes have to follow general criteria including 
access, affordability and comprehensiveness. 
In Australia, huge transfers from the federal government to the states are made 
under the special purpose programmes (SPPs). These SPPs are intended to support 
the implementation of some national priority and these are in addition to the transfers 
from the united pool of funds determined in the manner described earlier. The largest 
SPPs are in the areas of education, health, social security, transportation and housing. 
SPPs constitute a significant proportion of the total assistance from the federal 
government to the states. This proportion has varied from 25 percent of the total 
federal assistance in early 1970s to 50 percent in 1990s. The majority of the SPPs are 
subject to conditions—the conditions designed to ensure the achievement of national 
objectives. These conditions include general policy conditions that the amounts so 
transferred be spent on designated purposes only. Sometimes the transfers require 
matching expenditures from the state’s own sources for the same purpose. Such 
grants are determined through bilateral negotiations between the federal government 
and the concerned state as well as negotiations at some forum where all states are 
represented. In the United States, grants for health and income security constitute the 
major purposes for which transfers are made to the state and local governments. 
These grant programmes are discretionary at the national level and are determined 
through the annual budget process. The interstate highway system is financed jointly 
by the federal and state governments with federal government typically funding 90 
percent of the construction cost. Other major grant categories include education and 
transportation. In South Africa, in recent years the share of conditional specific 
purpose grants, which are discretionary in nature, have exhibited sizable growth in 
the total transfers to the provinces. The discretionary nature of the conditional grants 
has made the transfers system less transparent. 
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3.2.  Analysis of the Revenue Distribution Design 
 
3.2.1.  Fiscal Equalisation: What Method to Use? 
The subnationals typically encounter a fiscal gap—the difference between 
expenditure needs and the revenue means. The gap may arise either because a region 
does not inherently enjoy the potential to generate revenues or because the taxing powers 
are centralised with the federal government. Whatever the reason for the fiscal gap, 
leaving the gap unattended has economic as well as political ramifications. The gap may 
cause large fiscal disparities among the regions which could be politically divisive for the 
federation. This threat cannot be taken lightly. Since 1975 more than 40 countries have 
been created and a deeper analysis of the independence/liberation movements would 
reveal that fiscal disparity, among the regions of a nation, was at the heart of many if not 
all movements. Evidence suggests that addressing the fiscal gap helps curb the feeling of 
deprivation and therefore forestalls cessation threats. Australia and Canada have 
successfully thwarted cessation attempts by bridging the fiscal gap of the sub-nationals 
and through various autonomy measures. The primary tool of fiscal equalization, are 
intergovernmental transfers, in the form of revenue sharing and grants [Bilin (2005)]. The 
typical methods of determining the size of transfers from the federation to the sub-
nationals include: 
(1) Equalisation of fiscal capacities and fiscal needs, 
(2) Fiscal capacity equalisation, 
(3) Need criterion, 
(4) Population share criterion. 
The method of equalising the fiscal needs as well as the fiscal capacity recognises 
that both may vary across regions. This method of equalisation seeks to address the net 
variation in the fiscal need and fiscal capacities of the regions. The method of equalising 
fiscal capacity only assumes that the per capita fiscal needs are more or less equal across 
regions. This method aims to transfer more funds to the region whose fiscal capacity is 
below the national average. Both these methods require voluminous data on revenue 
generation, actual as well as potential, as well as minute details of the expenditure needs. 
The two methods are therefore difficult to use in developing countries.  
The need indicator criterion recognises that fiscal needs may vary across regions. 
This criterion seeks to estimate the expenditures of the subnationals on certain major 
fiscal needs using statistical and econometric techniques. These estimates are then used to 
compute the total fiscal need of the region. To estimate the expenditure on a certain need, 
say healthcare, the need index is developed using possible factors that may influence the 
healthcare such as the demographic profile of the region, the historical evidence on 
common ailments and the expenditures thereon. A certain weight is then assigned to 
healthcare needs keeping in view the value of the index and the historical share of the 
healthcare expenditure in the total expenditure. Need indicators typically used to estimate 
fiscal needs of the subnationals include: population, per capita income, unemployment 
rate, population density, geographical area, infant mortality, life expectancy, school 
enrolment rate and infrastructure. The multiple indicator criterion (MIC) adopted by the 
7th NFC is similar in spirit to the need indicator criterion. However the MIC includes 
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fewer indicators than are typically included in the criterion. The weight determination 
exercise for the individual elements of the MIC does not seem to be supported by a 
detailed and rigorous exercise and the weight of the population share is too large. 
The last of the four fiscal equalisation methods mentioned above is the population 
share criterion which has been in vogue in Pakistan until 2009. Ma (1997) argues that the 
use of population share criterion is least effective at securing equalisation of fiscal needs 
across regions. The population share criterion assumes that per capita expenditure needs 
are equal across regions. However, in practice, the per capita expenditure needs may 
vary, due to differences in population density, geography, history, resource endowments 
and the level of development. Moreover, the remote location or the difficult terrain of an 
area may increase the cost of delivering public services. The metropolitan character of a 
city may also call for incurring above average expenditures.  
 
3.2.2.  The Absence of Matching Grants from the Distribution Design 
The provinces in Pakistan are free to use the transfers from the federal government 
in the manner they deem fit. Such block unconditional transfers, though in accord with 
the spirit of the provincial autonomy, do not provide any guarantee that funds will be 
used to provide a minimum level of public service, especially in respect of essential 
needs like healthcare and education.  Thus, with unconditional block transfers the level of 
public service in respect of essential needs may vary across jurisdictions. The question 
then is, what is more important?—provincial autonomy or homogeneous minimum 
national standards across provinces for essential social services. 
The merits of provincial autonomy notwithstanding, there are strong arguments for 
setting uniform minimum national standards for essential social services like healthcare 
and education. The conventional wisdom that inequality is essential for economic growth 
[Kuznets (1955), Lewis (1954)] has been convincingly challenged in recent decades 
[Galor and Zeira (1993); Easterly (2007)]. Raising the living standards of lagging regions 
is now considered important for aggregate economic prosperity as well as for political 
stability. Moreover the homogeneous national standards encourage mobility of goods, 
services, labour and capital across jurisdictions. The uniform standards also increase the 
market for the goods of any region and allow the regions to gain from their respective 
comparative advantage. Establishing relatively homogeneous standards calls for incurring 
greater expenditures in regions that are below the national average. Conditional or 
matching grants can be used to achieve uniform standards across jurisdictions. A region 
that lags behind, say on healthcare indicators, can be induced by the federal government 
to improve healthcare services by conditioning the transfers with the kind of measurable 
improvement that is desired.  
Conditional or matching grants, especially for social needs like healthcare and 
education, are a key element of the transfer programme in the developed countries. This 
is despite the fact that the revenue mobilisation is fairly decentralised in these countries— 
United States, Canada and a number of other countries. The rationale for conditional 
transfers, besides the uniform national standards, is that the subnationals in an effort to 
woo businesses into their jurisdiction may impose lower tax burden on them. This may 
ultimately result in under provision of essential public services. Conditional grants ensure 
that essential services will be provided to the required minimum level.  
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Conditional grants could be administered in a variety of ways. Conditions may be 
imposed on the subnationals either with respect to inputs (i.e. expenditures) or outputs 
(i.e. desired results). The input grants may encourage the sub-nationals to engage in 
wasteful expenditure to show higher numbers. This kind of adverse incentive cannot be 
related to output based grants. Therefore the output based grants are preferable unless the 
measurement of output is highly difficult. Conditions would be imposed not on the 
specific use of grants but on attainment of standards in quality, access and level of 
service. Matching grants allow the subnationals to access transfers if they spend a certain 
specified percentage on a specific service from their own sources. Such grants are termed 
open-ended when there is no limit to transfers from the federal government on this count. 
Close-ended programmes, on the other hand, put a maximum cap on matching transfers. 
The close-ended programmes are favoured over open-ended grants because these can be 
designed while taking into account the budget constraint of the federal government.  
The literacy rate of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan is significantly 
lower than that of Punjab and Sindh (Table 2). It is obvious that the two lagging 
provinces need to spend more on education to bring their literacy rate closer to the 
other two provinces. 
 
Table 2 
Literacy Rate (Provincial Profile) 
Age Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
Literacy Rate 59 59 50 45 
Source: Demographic and Health Survey of Pakistan (2006). 
 
The use of elements like poverty and inverse population density as indicators in 
the distribution formula is based on the fact that some provinces lag behind others in the 
level of development. Greater funds have been transferred to the provinces under the 7th 
NFC Award on grounds of higher cost of delivery (reflected by Inverse Population 
Density) and poverty. Increase in literacy could be an ideal way to alleviate poverty on a 
long term basis. The block unconditional transfers do not guarantee that the additional 
funds will be used to alleviate poverty or, for example, will be spent on increasing access 
to education in the sparsely populated Balochistan. The two provinces could have been 
made to spend more on social services had the incremental transfers been conditioned 
upon certain improvement in literacy rate, enrolment rate or the patient-doctor ratio. A 
mix of general purpose and matching grants would better serve the cause of development 
in Pakistan. 
 
3.2.3.  Demographic Structure and Distribution Criteria 
The demand for public services for different age groups is different. For example, 
the population aged 5-20 needs education while the elderly require greater healthcare. If 
the age structure of the population varies across regions then, to provide equal level of 
services, the expenditure will vary across regions. The estimated province-wise age 
structure of population in Pakistan, as of 2006, shown in Table 3, depicts that the school 
age population is relatively greater in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and 
Balochistan while elderly population is greater in Punjab and Sindh.  
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Table 3 
School/College Age Population (Percent) 
Age Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
School Age (5–19  Years) 38.2 39.1 41.8 41.7 
Elderly (60 Years and Above) 7.0 5.0 5.8 4.3 
Source:  Demographic and Health Survey of Pakistan (2006). 
 
Given the province-wise demographic structure of the population, it is clear that 
the need to spend on education is greater in KP and Balochistan while the need to spend 
on healthcare is greater in the remaining two provinces. This will be true even if we 
assume equal per capita expenditure on these services across provinces. The foregoing 
suggests that to provide more accurately for the expenditure needs of the provinces the 
demographic structure should be accounted for in the distribution formula. However, the 
demographic structure is not an element of the multiple indicator distribution criteria 
adopted by the 7th NFC Award.  
 
3.2.4.  Weights of the Multiple Indicator Criteria 
The 7th NFC Award has assigned certain weights to the four elements of the multiple 
indicator criteria. There could be no two opinions that the methodology for the determination 
of weights should be widely known in the interest of transparency and public debate. 
However, this is not the case. It is unknown what role the historical expenditure patterns, 
statistical tools and research have played in the weight determination exercise and to what 
extent rough calculations and political manoeuvres have influenced the weights. The weights 
influenced by political compromises are likely to prove less stable as there could be a demand 
for revision with the change in the power configuration.  
To illustrate how the weights should be computed one could compute the per pupil 
cost of education for a school located in some remote area of Balochistan and compare 
this with the corresponding cost for some school located in the central Punjab. The 
difference in the two costs could form the basis for the weight of inverse population 
density. This example is only illustrative and of course the cost differential would have to 
be examined in greater detail to construct the weight. Similar exercises could be 
undertaken to compute the weights of other elements of the criteria. 
 
3.2.5.  Weight of Population Share 
The previous distribution criterion was criticised primarily on the ground of 
revenue sharing solely on the basis of population. With the assignment of 82 percent 
weight to the population share no major change has been effected in the distribution 
formula. Thus all the arguments put forth to criticise the previous formula are still valid. 
Very few countries make transfers to subnationals on the basis of population share and 
the ones that do accord it a small weight, for example 10-20 percent in India. A problem 
with the use of population share criterion is that the provinces may question the 
credibility of the population census. Nigeria, where transfers are solely on the basis of 
population, has encountered such problems. Perhaps in an effort to avoid the problems of 
the sort, India is still using the population figures of 1971 to distribute revenue according 
to weightage assigned to population.  
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3.2.6.  Poverty as an Element of Multiple Indicator Criteria 
It is generally argued that revenue distribution should not be based on indicators 
that are likely to generate perverse incentives. Poverty level is one such indicator. The 
use of poverty as an indicator acts as a disincentive for the provinces to alleviate poverty 
because the poorer a province, the greater its entitlement under the NFC Award. 
Moreover, the estimates of poverty levels in Pakistan have been questioned for accuracy. 
This has prompted the 7th NFC to use the average of the estimates generated by the three 
different agencies. Including ‘poverty’ as an element in the revenue distribution criteria 
will make the provinces  stakeholders in the poverty estimation exercise. How this would 
influence the estimates is difficult to tell. It may add to the controversy about the 
accuracy of the estimates but, on a positive note, the possibility is that the estimation 
exercise may become more transparent and less questionable, given the potential gains 
and losses of the different stakeholders. 
 
3.2.7.  Provincial Resource Mobilisation 
The National Finance Commission presently does not enjoy the mandate to offer 
advice on the provincial revenue generation but still designing the revenue distribution 
mechanisms hinges on the extent of own-source revenue generated by the provinces—if the 
provinces generate more own-source revenues the reliance on federal transfers decreases.  
The intergovernmental fiscal relationship in Pakistan is highly imbalanced. The 
provinces account for around 35 percent of all government expenditures but they generate 
merely 8 percent of the consolidated national total tax revenue which is only 0.5 percent 
of the GDP. The need to improve provincial resource mobilisation is but obvious. (A 
comparison of the intergovernmental fiscal imbalance is given in Table 4. Though six 
years old  the comparison still shows  that  decentralised revenue generation in Pakistan 
is among the lowest in the world).  
 
Table 4 
Imbalance between Revenue and Expenditure in Countries 
at the Sub-national level 
 Revenue Expenditure 
Australia 31 46 
Brazil 31 46 
Canada 56 63 
India 34 55 
South Korea 5 50 
Germany 35 63 
Pakistan 8 28 
Source: Adapted from Watts (2005), cited in Beaconhouse National University (2010). 
 
In the context of fiscal relationship between the federal government and the 
provinces the primary issue is how the fiscal needs of the provinces should be met? 
Whether the federal government should collect a larger part of the revenue and then 
transfer it to the provinces through some transfer mechanism or the provinces should be 
allowed to generate more revenues on their own and rely on the federal government only 
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The low revenue mobilisation on the part of the provinces should be viewed in the 
perspective of the national tax effort. The aggregate tax-to-GDP ratio in 2009-10 was 
10.5 percent and has been on the decline for over a decade (it was 12.5 percent in 1996). 
This is significantly lower than the average for developing countries (15 percent) as well 
as developed countries (35 percent). The tax-to-GDP ratio is much better even in the 
South Asian countries like Sri Lanka (16 percent) and India (14.5 percent) [Nabi and 
Shaikh (2011)]. According to Bhal, et al. (2008), the present state of revenue 
decentralisation and its future prospects present a dismal picture. Though the provinces 
have access to as many as 15 tax bases, the effective yields are very low. The tax bases 
are considerably eroded due to exemptions and are undervalued, incomplete and dated. 
Moreover, while the broad based taxes like personal income tax, tax on corporate profits, 
sales tax on goods and custom duties are with the federal government, the hard to collect 
taxes are with the provinces: sales tax on services and the tax on agricultural income—the 
former is administratively difficult and the latter is politically sensitive.  
Though most of the broad based taxes have been assigned to the federal 
government but the incentive to mobilise revenue at the central level may not be as much 
as it could be at the provincial level. The fact that 57 percent of what is collected does not 
remain with the federal government may dampen its incentive to increase collection from 
the revenue sources that are to be shared with provinces. Moreover, with access to money 
creation and foreign aid, the federal government may not be as hard pressed for cash as 
the provinces are—provinces cannot create money and they have only recently been 
allowed to borrow abroad, but only under restrictive conditions.  
Though the conventional wisdom suggests that broad based taxes like the personal 
income tax and the tax on corporate profits should be with the federal government, some 
federal governments in developed countries are successfully sharing these taxes with the 
subnationals. The federal government in Pakistan shares the tax revenue with the 
provinces but only through the NFC Award, not the tax bases.  
The devolution of taxes has several advantages. If the provinces are allowed to 
share the broad based tax bases like personal income tax and tax on corporate profits with 
the federal government this would solve the free rider problem. The provinces would 
make an effort to generate more from the two tax bases because the revenue would 
belong to them. Moreover, better revenue generation by one province can generate a 
strong demonstration effect, encouraging other provinces to emulate the example set by 
the high revenue generating province. To accomplish the sharing of the tax bases, the 
federal government may reduce its tax rate on corporate profits and personal income to 
make room for the provinces to levy tax on these bases. For example, a reduction of 10 
percentage point in corporate tax rate will allow the provinces to tax corporate profits at 
the rate of 10 percent. The revenue loss that federal government will incur would be 
offset by the reduced transfers to the provinces under the NFC Award. Overall the 
national tax revenue is likely to increase due to this kind of sharing because of the greater 
incentive of the provincial governments to collect more taxes. 
 
2This discussion draws on the chapter on ‘Provincial Resource Mobilisation’ in Fiscal Decentralisation 
in Pakistan, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 
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The devolution of taxes like income tax to the provinces in Pakistan is criticised on 
the ground that the provinces do not have the requisite administrative capacity for the 
purpose, which with all its machinery and power even the federation finds difficult to 
collect. Increase in collection cost due to the loss of scale economies is yet another 
argument against decentralisation of revenue generation. Here one can learn from the 
Canadian example. In Canada though the taxes have been devolved in the sense that the 
provinces are free to set their own rate structure, a single Canadian Revenue Agency 
collects the income tax on behalf of the provinces [Boadway (2007)]. A system on these 
lines can also be developed in Pakistan. The collection of provincial revenue against the 
tax bases being shared with the federal government can be assigned to the federal 
government for a certain charge. The collection of taxes by the Federal Board of 
Revenue, on behalf of the provinces will take care of the supposedly low collection 
capacity in the provinces and a higher aggregate collection cost under the devolution. 
 
3.2.8.  Revenue Generation Effort 
The 7th NFC has included revenue generation (more commonly known as tax 
effort) as an element of the resource distribution criteria. This is a welcome 
development. However, the 10 percent weight assigned to revenue generation is not 
enough to induce the provinces to increase their tax effort.  The effort made by the 
provinces to generate tax revenue is accounted for in a number of countries while 
determining the size of transfers. The objective is to encourage the provinces to 
generate more own-source revenue by rewarding the existing revenue generation. 
Own-source revenue generation has a number of advantages. It reduces dependency 
on the federal government and improves governance at the regional level. Moreover , 
each province can levy taxes in accordance with the preferences of the electorate for 
the level and kind of public service required. 
Moore (2000) argues that nations that mostly rely on unearned income (defined as 
foreign aid or income from natural resources) are typically poorly governed. The reason is 
simple: with easy access to money the rulers do not have to enter into a ‘bargain with the 
citizens’—taxation revenues in return for good governance and better service delivery. 
Unconditional transfers from the federal government to the subnational governments are like 
aid to a country from a foreign nation—this reduces the need to raise revenue from the 
citizens and thus saves the rulers from a more difficult task—providing good governance and 
better service delivery.
3
 If the federal government conditions the transfers to the provinces 
with sufficient demonstration of own-source revenue generation effort, then the provinces 
would have no choice but to mobilise more own-source revenue.  
 
3.2.9.  Revenue Generation Effort as Element of Distribution Criteria 
Though the inclusion of revenue generation as an element of the distribution 
criteria is a step in the right direction, there are some issues in its implementation. 
Revenue generation as an element of distribution criteria means the total tax revenue 
generated in a province i.e., the tax collected in a province against the tax bases assigned 
 
3One reason why very meagre amount of agricultural income tax is collected in Pakistan is that the tax 
lies in the domain of the provinces which have little incentive to mobilise own revenues owing to their reliance 
on transfers from the federation. 
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to the federal government as well as to the provinces. As argued below, a better approach 
for this purpose would be to consider only the revenue generated against provincial tax 
bases (own-source revenue). 
If the objective of the inclusion of ‘revenue generation effort’ in the distribution 
criteria is to encourage generation of own-source revenue by the provinces, then it is not 
clear how distribution on the basis of federal revenue generated in a province would 
encourage generation of own-source revenue. Moreover, collection of revenues by the 
provinces against tax bases assigned to the federal government would not yield (and has 
not so far yielded) the benefits of own-source revenue generation for two reasons. First, 
the machinery for tax collection is federal rather than provincial and secondly, the 
citizens do not expect the provincial governments to provide better services in return for 
federal taxes. Thus the improvement in governance at the provincial level would not 
result merely because more federal revenue is being generated by a province.  
Another problem with the use of the revenue collected in a province against 
federal tax bases is that numerous firms do business and generate income in more than 
one province. Logically, the tax should be payable in the province where the income is 
generated. However, for administrative convenience the firms are required to pay tax on 
their consolidated national income in the province where the head office of the firm is 
located. Since the income tax is a federal tax, therefore the provinces, as well as the 
federal government, were till now indifferent to whether the tax payable from income 
generated in province X is actually deposited in province X or province Y. However now, 
that the revenue generation is an element of the distribution criteria, the administrative 
convenience referred to above gives an undue advantage to the province that might be 
host to head offices of a greater number of firms.  For example the banking sector—the 
largest tax payer, generates income from all over the country, but pays income tax mostly 
in Sindh on its consolidated income in the country. The reason is that the head offices of 
most of the banks are located in Karachi—the capital city of Sindh. A more realistic 
approach therefore would be to include only the revenue generated against provincial tax 
bases for determining the tax effort of the province.  
If at all it is essential to include the revenue generated against federal tax bases 
then the income generated by multi-provincial firms in each province should be estimated 
so that the tax liability against the province-wise income of the firm can be assessed for 
the purpose of the distribution criteria. Whereas estimating regional profits for a multi-
provincial firm may be a difficult exercise, the practices adopted by different countries 
can be examined to estimate the regional earnings.  
If the changes discussed above are incorporated in the distribution design, then the 
weight of 5 percent assigned to revenue generation should be increased significantly to 
encourage own-source revenue generation by the provinces. This would encourage the 
provinces to increase revenue generation from the provincial tax bases. It may be 
mentioned here that some important tax bases assigned to the provinces include property 
tax, tax on agricultural income and GST on services.  
 
3.2.10. Specification of the Divisible Pool: A Disincentive for Resource Mobilisation 
The process of distribution of revenues between the federal government and the 
provinces begins with the specification of the divisible pool—the revenue sources which 
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the federal government can share with the provinces. Most but not all revenue sources are 
included in the divisible pool, for example personal and corporate taxes are a part of the 
divisible pool while Petroleum Development Levy (PDL) is not. Exclusion of some 
revenue sources from the divisible pool encourages the federal government to concentrate 
on increasing revenues from the excluded sources because the revenue from these does 
not have to be shared with the provinces. The specification of divisible pool creates a 
disincentive for the federal government to increase revenues from the sources which 
comprise the divisible pool. To illustrate, suppose that the federal government wants to 
raise its own revenue by Rs 100. To raise the required amount through tax on corporate 
profits the federal government would have to increase the corporate tax rate by such 
percentage that an additional amount of Rs 236 is mobilised. The federal government 
needs to mobilise more than the revenue that it requires because 57.5 percent of the 
additional revenue i.e. Rs 136 would go to the provinces,  leaving the federal government 
with the required Rs 100. An alternative for the federal government is to increase the 
PDL by such percentage so as needed raise an additional Rs 100 only. The PDL requires 
lesser increase because it is not a part of the divisible pool i.e. the revenues from PDL are 
not to be shared with the provinces.  
How can these disincentives be avoided? Table 5 provides the answer. At present 
44 percent of the gross national revenue is being transferred to the provinces. Instead of 
specifying an elaborate list of revenue sources which would form the divisible pool, it 
can be simply stated that 44 percent of the gross federal revenue would constitute the 
pool of resources divisible among the provinces. This would take care of the federal 
disincentive to increase revenue from the sources that are divisible. This of course would 
have to be qualified with details like excluding royalties from oil and gas, which are to be 
transferred in full to the province concerned.   
 
Table 5 
Revenue Transferred to Provinces 
 
NFC Financial Year 
Revenue Transferred to Provinces as Percentage of Gross 
Total Revenue of Federal Government (%) 
NFC 1991 1991-92 26.0 
 1992-93 26.1 
 1993-94 27.9 
 1994-95 30.1 
 1995-96 31.8 
NFC 1996 1996-97 33.8 
 1997-98 26.3 
 1998-99 24.2 
 1999-00 27.4 
 2000-01 30.4 
 2001-02 27.7 
 2002-03 27.5 
 2003-04 27.8 
 2004-05 28.0 
 2005-06 29.5 
NFC 2006 2006-07  
 2007-08  
 2008-09 31.4 
 2009-10 31.9 
NFC 2009 2010-11 44.6 
 2011-12* 44.0 
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3.2.11. Evaluation of Distribution Design Against Best Practice 
The broad principles of resource distribution design derived from the review of 
relevant literature are given in Box 1. 
 
Source: Primarily Adapted from Pulling Back from the Abyss: Third Annual Report, Institute of Public Policy, 
Beaconhouse National University. (The last point ‘Accountability’ is an addition to the criteria 
included in the report.) 
 
The revenue distribution design in Pakistan fares well on the yardsticks of 
autonomy and simplicity. Predictability is not complete but not bad either. However, it 
scores poorly on the scales of ‘incentives’ and ‘accountability’ whereas it is too early to 
assess it in terms of ‘revenue adequacy’ and ‘equity’. The performance of the distribution 
design is discussed below in some detail. 
The subnationals enjoy complete autonomy as to the use of the funds available, the 
criteria is simple enough—the weights assigned to the elements of the criteria are known 
in advance and one has to know only, for example, the population of a province to figure 
out the grant entitlement of the province against the population share. The absolute 
amounts of transfers that a province is to receive are partially predictable. The criterion 
describes the transfers in terms of percentage share of the divisible pool. The absolute 
size of the divisible pool in a financial year depends upon the revenue that the federal 
government is able to generate against the sources included in the divisible pool. The 
transfers are predictable in the sense that the federal government sets the target for 
collection against each tax source, thus the targeted amount of the divisible pool and the 
targeted provincial shares are known at the beginning of the financial year. However, the 
transfers are unpredictable in the sense that in recent years the federal government has 
been missing the revenue target by a significant margin. This introduces an element of 
uncertainty regarding the size of the divisible pool and hence the provincial share of 
transfers. More time is required to grade the new distribution design on the criteria of 
‘revenue adequacy’ and ‘equity’.  On the one hand, a large number of new functions have 
been transferred to the provinces under the 18th amendment, while greater funds are 
Box 1 
Autonomy: The transfers should allow the subnational governments to determine their 
own expenditure priorities. 
Predictability: The amount transfers should be known well in advance so that the 
provinces may budget their expenditures with a modicum of certainty. 
Simplicity: The transfer criteria should be objective and be fairly easy to understand. 
Equity: The transfers should take care of the fiscal needs of each subnational 
government. 
Revenue Adequacy: Transfers should take care of the imbalance in resource 
availability between the federation and the provinces as well as amongst the 
provinces. 
Incentives: transfers should encourage constituent units to raise revenues and control 
expenditures. 
Accountability: The grantor must be accountable for the design and operation of the 
programme. The recipients must be accountable to the grantor and the citizens for 
financial integrity and better utilisation. 
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being transferred under the 7th NFC Award. With more functions to perform, and greater 
financial resources at the disposal of the provinces, only time will tell whether the 
resources are enough to meet the financial needs of the provinces and if these are 
equitably distributed across provinces.  
The revenue distribution design fares poorly in terms of ‘incentives’ to raise own-
source revenue and ‘accountability’ for the appropriate use of the transfers. As discussed 
in section 3.2.8, the 7th Award in fact had a dampening effect on own-source revenue 
generation. The reason of course is greater transfers from the federal government. Lesser 
transfers from the federal government coupled with perhaps partial allocation of some 
attractive tax bases, like income tax, to the provinces will encourage the provinces to 
increase revenue generation from their own tax sources. This is also likely to make the 
provinces more accountable to their own electorate as successful taxation is essentially a 
bargain between the citizens and the government.  
To conclude, the distribution design is simple, allows autonomy to the provinces 
as to the use of funds and the amount of transfers is predictable, though with a degree of 
uncertainty. However, the distribution design offers no encouragement to the provinces to 
raise own-source revenue. The two principles, namely ‘autonomy’ and ‘incentives to 
raise own-source revenue’ may at times conflict—the distribution design that offers 
greater incentive for own-source revenue generation may not always allow complete 
autonomy to the constituents as to the use of transfers. For example, the use of matching 
grants in some developed countries restricts the use of transfers for certain specific 
purposes but at the same time encourages own-source revenue generation because the 
subnationals have to spend a part of the amount from own sources. It is society in general 
and the policy makers in particular who choose between greater provincial autonomy in 
the use of transfers and more incentives to generate own-source revenue. The latter has 
more benefits from the perspective of economic development and good governance. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The 7th NFC Award in December 2009 ended a prolonged deadlock over the 
design of the distribution of revenue resources. Yet the present institutional structure of 
the NFC remains prone to potential deadlocks in the future. The two-tier institutional 
structure proposed in this study can be helpful in smooth functioning of the NFC with 
better distribution mechanisms. Though the new distribution design is an improvement 
over the previous one but still it does not come close to the international best practices. 
For example, the population share—which is not a part of the distribution design in 
developed countries and carries a small weight in some developing countries—has a large 
weight of 82 percent in  Pakistan. A good design should encourage own-source revenue 
generation by the provinces as against the potential dampening effect of the 7th NFC 
Award in this respect. The distribution design, on its own, can only partially encourage 
own-source revenue generation e.g., by including the revenue effort and matching grants 
in the distribution design. While the weight of the revenue effort is not large enough, the 
matching grants do not figure at all in the prevailing distribution design. To further 
encourage own-source revenue generation, the federal government needs to share broad 
base tax bases, like the income and corporate taxes, with the provinces rather than 
transferring the revenue from these through the distribution design. 
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